Praxis, libertad y afecciones: sobre la “supra-naturaleza” de la voluntad en Duns Escoto
In dealing with the will, Scotus and Aristotle are not so far that Scotus himself denies their continuity, nor so close that he avoids reinterpreting the Aristotelian notion of prohaíresis in light of the Christian philosophy of freedom. His reinterpretaion consists in conceiving the will as a ratio...
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Centro de Estudios Filosóficos Medievales, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo
2022
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.uncu.edu.ar/ojs3/index.php/scripta/article/view/6096 |
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I11-R111article-60962022-09-01T11:17:58Z Praxis, Freedom and Affections: On the “supra-nature” of the Will in Duns Scotus Praxis, libertad y afecciones: sobre la “supra-naturaleza” de la voluntad en Duns Escoto Ginocchio, David González Lecón, Mauricio Aristóteles Duns Escoto libertad voluntad naturaleza Aristotle Duns Scotus freedom Will nature In dealing with the will, Scotus and Aristotle are not so far that Scotus himself denies their continuity, nor so close that he avoids reinterpreting the Aristotelian notion of prohaíresis in light of the Christian philosophy of freedom. His reinterpretaion consists in conceiving the will as a rational power, that is to say, free, and the intellect as a natural power. In this paper we will insist on this continuity and discontinuity in the following order: 1) we will show to what extent Scotus’s will goes beyond intellection and, in that sense, “nature”, focusing on the cases of incontinence and negligent omissions; 2) we will trace the structure of the Scotist will, following and answering Barnwell; 3) we will later study the freedom of the will, as Scotus understands it, mainly in his commentary on Metaphysics IX and, finally, 4) we will return to the influence of passions and the habits on the will for determining what is good. Our purpose is to show that Scotus takes up Aristotelian formulations to show how the will is a properly rational appetite, i.e. pace Aristotle, not properly an appetite. Al tratar de la voluntad, la distancia entre Escoto y Aristóteles no está tan lejos que el propio Escoto deje de mostrar su continuidad, ni es tan pequeña que evite reinterpretar la noción aristotélica de prohaíresis a la luz de la filosofía cristiana de la libertad. Ésta consiste en concebir la voluntad como una potencia racional, vale decir, libre, y al intelecto como potencia natural. En este trabajo insistiremos en esta continuidad y discontinuidad en el siguiente orden: 1) mostraremos en qué medida la voluntad escotista va más allá de la intelección y, en ese sentido, de la “naturaleza”, fijándonos en los casos de la incontinencia y la negligencia deliberada; 2) rastrearemos la estructura de la voluntad escotista, siguiendo y contestando a Barnwell; 3) estudiaremos después la libertad de la voluntad, tal como la entiende Escoto, principalmente en el comentario a Metafísica IX y, por fin, 4) volveremos a la influencia de las pasiones y los hábitos en la voluntad para la determinación del bien. Nuestro propósito es mostrar que Escoto retoma las formulaciones aristotélicas para mostrar en qué sentido la voluntad es un apetito propiamente racional, es decir, pace Aristóteles, no propiamente un apetito. Centro de Estudios Filosóficos Medievales, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo 2022-08-25 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://revistas.uncu.edu.ar/ojs3/index.php/scripta/article/view/6096 10.48162/rev.35.014 Scripta Mediaevalia; Vol. 15 No. 1 (2022); 169-210 Scripta Mediaevalia; Vol. 15 Núm. 1 (2022); 169-210 2362-4868 1851-8753 spa https://revistas.uncu.edu.ar/ojs3/index.php/scripta/article/view/6096/4943 Derechos de autor 2022 David González Ginocchio, Mauricio Lecón http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/deed.es |
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Universidad Nacional de Cuyo |
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Revistas en línea |
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Scripta Mediaevalia |
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Scripta Mediaevalia |
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Online |
| author |
Ginocchio, David González Lecón, Mauricio |
| spellingShingle |
Ginocchio, David González Lecón, Mauricio Praxis, libertad y afecciones: sobre la “supra-naturaleza” de la voluntad en Duns Escoto Aristóteles Duns Escoto libertad voluntad naturaleza Aristotle Duns Scotus freedom Will nature |
| author_facet |
Ginocchio, David González Lecón, Mauricio |
| author_sort |
Ginocchio, David González |
| title |
Praxis, libertad y afecciones: sobre la “supra-naturaleza” de la voluntad en Duns Escoto |
| title_short |
Praxis, libertad y afecciones: sobre la “supra-naturaleza” de la voluntad en Duns Escoto |
| title_full |
Praxis, libertad y afecciones: sobre la “supra-naturaleza” de la voluntad en Duns Escoto |
| title_fullStr |
Praxis, libertad y afecciones: sobre la “supra-naturaleza” de la voluntad en Duns Escoto |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Praxis, libertad y afecciones: sobre la “supra-naturaleza” de la voluntad en Duns Escoto |
| title_sort |
praxis, freedom and affections: on the “supra-nature” of the will in duns scotus |
| description |
In dealing with the will, Scotus and Aristotle are not so far that Scotus himself denies their continuity, nor so close that he avoids reinterpreting the Aristotelian notion of prohaíresis in light of the Christian philosophy of freedom. His reinterpretaion consists in conceiving the will as a rational power, that is to say, free, and the intellect as a natural power. In this paper we will insist on this continuity and discontinuity in the following order: 1) we will show to what extent Scotus’s will goes beyond intellection and, in that sense, “nature”, focusing on the cases of incontinence and negligent omissions; 2) we will trace the structure of the Scotist will, following and answering Barnwell; 3) we will later study the freedom of the will, as Scotus understands it, mainly in his commentary on Metaphysics IX and, finally, 4) we will return to the influence of passions and the habits on the will for determining what is good. Our purpose is to show that Scotus takes up Aristotelian formulations to show how the will is a properly rational appetite, i.e. pace Aristotle, not properly an appetite. |
| publisher |
Centro de Estudios Filosóficos Medievales, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo |
| publishDate |
2022 |
| url |
https://revistas.uncu.edu.ar/ojs3/index.php/scripta/article/view/6096 |
| topic |
Aristóteles Duns Escoto libertad voluntad naturaleza Aristotle Duns Scotus freedom Will nature |
| topic_facet |
Aristóteles Duns Escoto libertad voluntad naturaleza Aristotle Duns Scotus freedom Will nature |
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1800221147061551104 |
