El problema de la racionalidad y el debate entre internismo y externismo epistemológicos. Una intervención a propósito del debate entre Williams y Goldman
In this work, we will focus on the debate between epistemological internalism and externalism, starting from the debate between Michael Williams and Alvin Goldman, as it appears in their exchange of texts in the 2016 volume Goldman and his critics. We will provide a context for this discussion by me...
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| Formato: | Online |
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Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo
2019
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.uncu.edu.ar/ojs3/index.php/philosophia/article/view/2116 |
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Cormick, Claudio |
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Cormick, Claudio El problema de la racionalidad y el debate entre internismo y externismo epistemológicos. Una intervención a propósito del debate entre Williams y Goldman Goldman Williams internismo externismo racionalidad Goldman Williams internalism externalism rationality |
| author_facet |
Cormick, Claudio |
| author_sort |
Cormick, Claudio |
| title |
El problema de la racionalidad y el debate entre internismo y externismo epistemológicos. Una intervención a propósito del debate entre Williams y Goldman |
| title_short |
El problema de la racionalidad y el debate entre internismo y externismo epistemológicos. Una intervención a propósito del debate entre Williams y Goldman |
| title_full |
El problema de la racionalidad y el debate entre internismo y externismo epistemológicos. Una intervención a propósito del debate entre Williams y Goldman |
| title_fullStr |
El problema de la racionalidad y el debate entre internismo y externismo epistemológicos. Una intervención a propósito del debate entre Williams y Goldman |
| title_full_unstemmed |
El problema de la racionalidad y el debate entre internismo y externismo epistemológicos. Una intervención a propósito del debate entre Williams y Goldman |
| title_sort |
problem of rationality and the debate between epistemological internalism and externalism. an intervention in relation to the debate between williams and goldman |
| description |
In this work, we will focus on the debate between epistemological internalism and externalism, starting from the debate between Michael Williams and Alvin Goldman, as it appears in their exchange of texts in the 2016 volume Goldman and his critics. We will provide a context for this discussion by means of pointing out that, whereas a series of authors (in particular, Laurence BonJour and, after his tracks, Jennifer Lackey and Fernando Broncano) extract from the internalism/externalism debate the "dualistic" consequence according to which knowledge cannot be analysed from only one perspective, but there exist at least two"”that of subjective rationality and that of conduciveness to truth"”, Goldman appears on the contrary as a "hard line" externalist for whom internalism is simply untenable and thus epistemic justification is to be understood exclusively in reliabilist terms. Against this background, we will analyse Williams’ proposal. On the one hand, this author attempts to prove that Goldman’s criticisms of internalism are limited to only a "mentalistic" or "subjectivistic" version of it. On the other hand, he seeks to vindicate a moderate internalist epistemology by relying on the tenet that human knowledge is indissociably linked to considerations of accountability. We will try to show that Goldman’s reply, which is focused on denouncing an alleged confusion by Williams between the problem of "justifiedness" and the problem of "justification", does not do justice to the real scope of the question of epistemic justification, once this question is analysed, not on the basis of alleged "intuitions" about the meaning of "knowledge" in ordinary language, but on the basis of practices in which such notions can operate. |
| publisher |
Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo |
| publishDate |
2019 |
| url |
https://revistas.uncu.edu.ar/ojs3/index.php/philosophia/article/view/2116 |
| topic |
Goldman Williams internismo externismo racionalidad Goldman Williams internalism externalism rationality |
| topic_facet |
Goldman Williams internismo externismo racionalidad Goldman Williams internalism externalism rationality |
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1800220668031139840 |
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I11-R96article-21162020-02-04T18:35:55Z The problem of rationality and the debate between epistemological internalism and externalism. An intervention in relation to the debate between Williams and Goldman El problema de la racionalidad y el debate entre internismo y externismo epistemológicos. Una intervención a propósito del debate entre Williams y Goldman Cormick, Claudio Goldman Williams internismo externismo racionalidad Goldman Williams internalism externalism rationality In this work, we will focus on the debate between epistemological internalism and externalism, starting from the debate between Michael Williams and Alvin Goldman, as it appears in their exchange of texts in the 2016 volume Goldman and his critics. We will provide a context for this discussion by means of pointing out that, whereas a series of authors (in particular, Laurence BonJour and, after his tracks, Jennifer Lackey and Fernando Broncano) extract from the internalism/externalism debate the "dualistic" consequence according to which knowledge cannot be analysed from only one perspective, but there exist at least two"”that of subjective rationality and that of conduciveness to truth"”, Goldman appears on the contrary as a "hard line" externalist for whom internalism is simply untenable and thus epistemic justification is to be understood exclusively in reliabilist terms. Against this background, we will analyse Williams’ proposal. On the one hand, this author attempts to prove that Goldman’s criticisms of internalism are limited to only a "mentalistic" or "subjectivistic" version of it. On the other hand, he seeks to vindicate a moderate internalist epistemology by relying on the tenet that human knowledge is indissociably linked to considerations of accountability. We will try to show that Goldman’s reply, which is focused on denouncing an alleged confusion by Williams between the problem of "justifiedness" and the problem of "justification", does not do justice to the real scope of the question of epistemic justification, once this question is analysed, not on the basis of alleged "intuitions" about the meaning of "knowledge" in ordinary language, but on the basis of practices in which such notions can operate. En este trabajo nos referiremos al debate entre internismo y externismo epistemológicos a partir del episodio que constituye el debate entre Michael Williams y Alvin Goldman, que se expresa en el intercambio de trabajos presente en el volumen del año 2016 Goldman and his critics. Enmarcaremos esta discusión señalando que, mientras una serie de autores (en particular Laurence BonJour y, siguiendo su influencia, Jennifer Lackey y Fernando Broncano) extrae del debate internismo/externismo la consecuencia "dualista" de que el conocimiento no puede analizarse según un único eje, sino que hallamos al menos dos -el de la razonabilidad subjetiva y el de la conductividad a la verdad-, Goldman se presenta como un externista de "línea dura" para el cual el internismo es simplemente insostenible y la justificación epistémica ha de comprenderse exclusivamente en términos confiabilistas. Sobre este trasfondo, analizaremos la propuesta de Williams, quien por un lado busca probar que las críticas de Goldman al internismo quedan restringidas a una versión "mentalista" o "subjetivista", y, por el otro, busca ratificar una epistemología internista moderada apoyándose en el señalamiento de que el conocimiento humano es indisociable de consideraciones de responsabilidad (accountability). Buscaremos probar que la réplica de Goldman, que se centra en denunciar una presunta confusión por Williams entre el problema del "estar justificado" y el del "justificar", no hace justicia a la amplitud del problema de la justificación epistémica, una vez que este es abordado, no a partir de presuntas "intuiciones" sobre el significado de "conocimiento" en el lenguaje ordinario, sino a partir de las prácticas en las que nociones como esta pueden hacerse funcionar. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo 2019-07-31 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://revistas.uncu.edu.ar/ojs3/index.php/philosophia/article/view/2116 Philosophia; Vol. 79 No. 1 (2019); 35-62 Philosophia; Vol. 79 Núm. 1 (2019); 35-62 2313-9528 0328-9672 spa https://revistas.uncu.edu.ar/ojs3/index.php/philosophia/article/view/2116/1559 https://revistas.uncu.edu.ar/ojs3/index.php/philosophia/article/view/2116/2074 Derechos de autor 2019 Philosophia |
