El Problema de la Reflexión-c como Apercepción Pura en Kant on Reflection and Virtue de Melissa Merritt
The purpose of this paper is to expose and criticize Melissa Merritt’s interpretation of the concept of reflection in Kant’s philosophical work as presented in her book Kant on Reflection and Virtue. Specifically, it attempts to establish that her equalization between pure apperception and c-reflect...
Guardado en:
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Online |
| Lenguaje: | eng |
| Publicado: |
Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo
2020
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.uncu.edu.ar/ojs3/index.php/philosophia/article/view/4418 |
| Sumario: | The purpose of this paper is to expose and criticize Melissa Merritt’s interpretation of the concept of reflection in Kant’s philosophical work as presented in her book Kant on Reflection and Virtue. Specifically, it attempts to establish that her equalization between pure apperception and c-reflection is problematic. To achieve this, the paper exposes Merritt’s notions of reflection and compares them with the notion of pure apperception in Kant’s first Critique to show how pure apperception cannot be identified with c-reflection as it is characterized by her. |
|---|
