El sentimiento corpóreo entre la teoría hilemórfica y la perspectiva cartesiana
The present article offers a contribution to a first-person ontology, as required by Searle for the mental. It takes recourse to Antonio Rosmini’s philosophy of the fundamental bodily feeling, which corresponds to what is usually called lived or subjective body (Leib). After revising several contemp...
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| Formato: | Online |
| Lenguaje: | spa |
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Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo
2022
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.uncu.edu.ar/ojs3/index.php/philosophia/article/view/6202 |
| Sumario: | The present article offers a contribution to a first-person ontology, as required by Searle for the mental. It takes recourse to Antonio Rosmini’s philosophy of the fundamental bodily feeling, which corresponds to what is usually called lived or subjective body (Leib). After revising several contemporary versions of hylomorphism, I conclude that not just any of them is convincing for the philosophy of mind. With the notions of principle and term Rosmini widens the ontological repertory in order to explicate the unity of the human being, incorporating those of matter and form from a lato sensu Cartesian perspective. |
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