La vertiente trifurcada: de la primera persona a la conciencia y el yo
This article analyzes three positions that share the first-person perspective as starting point in debates on philosophy of mind; however, each one has a different concept of consciousness and the self. The biological naturalism of John Searle, the neurophenomenology inspired by Francisco Varela and...
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| Formato: | Online |
| Lenguaje: | spa |
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Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo
2022
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.uncu.edu.ar/ojs3/index.php/philosophia/article/view/6204 |
| Sumario: | This article analyzes three positions that share the first-person perspective as starting point in debates on philosophy of mind; however, each one has a different concept of consciousness and the self. The biological naturalism of John Searle, the neurophenomenology inspired by Francisco Varela and Dan Zahavi’s phenomenology of mind are studied in order to show the reasons why the same area of analysis gives rise to different stances. |
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