Persona, naturaleza y voluntad en el comentario a las Sentencias de Pedro Lombardo de Tomás de Aquino
It has been hold recently that human will, or at least its freedom, should be understood in Aquinas as being linked directly to the person, and emerging beyond human nature. The human action would belong primarily to the person, while nature would be only the root of a global and generic inclina...
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| Publicado en: | Scripta mediaevalia |
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| Autor principal: | |
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| Acceso en línea: | https://bdigital.uncu.edu.ar/fichas.php?idobjeto=3786 |
| Sumario: | It has been hold recently that human will, or at least its freedom,
should be understood in Aquinas as being linked directly to the
person, and emerging beyond human nature. The human action would
belong primarily to the person, while nature would be only the root of
a global and generic inclination. This hypothesis is founded upon the
idea that efficient cause is the only real cause.
As a matter of fact, the will’s emergence above the nature appears as
a problem in Aquinas’ works -in the Commentary to the Sentences in
particular-. Nevertheless, Aquinas points out that the will or their acts
can not follow the person. The will as a faculty follows the human
nature and the acts of the will are executed by the person as efficient
cause -last in its order-, but according to the reason as formal cause. |
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