Controversias en torno a la significación empírica de los supuestos auxiliares
Theoretical laws need to be conjoined with auxiliary assumptions in order to be empirically testable, whether in natural or social science. A particularly heated debate has been developing over the nature and role of these assumptions in economic theories. The so called "F(riedman)-Twist"...
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| Formato: | Online |
| Lenguaje: | eng |
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Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo
2020
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.uncu.edu.ar/ojs3/index.php/philosophia/article/view/3640 |
| Sumario: | Theoretical laws need to be conjoined with auxiliary assumptions in order to be empirically testable, whether in natural or social science. A particularly heated debate has been developing over the nature and role of these assumptions in economic theories. The so called "F(riedman)-Twist" ("the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions", Friedman 1953) as well as some later criticisms by authors like Musgrave, Lawson, Mäki and Cartwright will be examined. I will explore the apparent conflict between the Popperian desideratum to pursue the independent testability of auxiliary assumptions and the idealizational theoretical means needed to isolate causal variables. |
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