Perspectiva de segunda persona y racionalidad en las decisiones morales. Evidencia científica y límites del emotivismo
The article examines moral emotivism following two lines of argument. The first one considers its alleged support by the results of the cognitive sciences, showing that opposite interpretations of the same evidence are possible. The second one explores the second-person perspective in our ethical de...
Guardado en:
| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Online |
| Lenguaje: | spa |
| Publicado: |
Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo
2021
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.uncu.edu.ar/ojs3/index.php/philosophia/article/view/5556 |
| Sumario: | The article examines moral emotivism following two lines of argument. The first one considers its alleged support by the results of the cognitive sciences, showing that opposite interpretations of the same evidence are possible. The second one explores the second-person perspective in our ethical decisions. From the analysis we can conclude the fundamental importance of rationality both for the recognition of the other person and for the formation of the ethical judgement. The paper concludes that, even though emotions are necessary, they are not sufficient for the formation of an ethical judgement, underlining that rationality is needed. |
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